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Notes and Comments
Hugh M. Kindred*

New Consumer
Legislation in
Nova Scotia

While political observers were commenting upon the dullness of
the 1975' spring session of the Legislature, something approaching
a quiet revolution was taking place in Consumer Law. Changes
were heralded in January 1975 when the amendments of late 19732
to the Consumer Services Act 3 were proclaimed in force. The
amendments expanded the functions of the Consumer Services
Bureau and, most importantly, permitted for the first time the
appointment of a minister of Cabinet rank to administer the Act. A
few days before the Legislature met in March, Dr. Maynard
McAskill was named to that position.
The new minister wasted no time in acting. The first bill in the
Assembly was introduced by him. In all, three consumer bills were
passed during the sitting. In order of introduction they were Bill 1,
the Collection Agencies Act, 4 Bill 36, 5 being amendments to the
Consumer Protection Act, 6 and Bill 116, The Direct Sellers'
Licensing and Regulation Act. 7 This note will comment on each in
turn.
The greatest changes are wrought by the amendments contained
in Bill 36 to the Consumer Protection Act. Previously the Act
regulated credit granters and required disclosure of credit terms.
Now it is supplemented by the addition of substantive clauses
affecting the contractual conditions of consumer transactions. For
*Hugh M. Kindred, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. January 24, 1975.
2. S.N.S. 1973 (2d Sess.), c.5.
3. S.N.S. 1968, c.5.
4. S.N.S. 1975, c.7, proclaimed July 29, 1975 to take effect September 30, 1975.
Regulations made September 30, 1975 to take effect October 1, 1975. (Hereafter
cited as 'CAA').
5. S.N.S. 1975, c.19, proclaimed July 8, 1975 to come into force August 15,
1975.
6. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 53 as amended. (Hereafter cited as 'CPA').
7. S.N.S. 1975, c.9, proclaimed September 2, 1975 to come into force October 1,
1975. Regulations made September 2, 1975 to take effect October 2, 1975.
(Hereafter cited as 'DSLRA').
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the first time in Nova Scotia minimum standards of goods and
services are inescapably imposed in consumer sales. Bill 36
achieved this end by the addition of three sections numbered 20(C) (E) to the principal Act.
The prerequisite to the application of the Act is the presence of a
'consumer sale". This transaction is defined by a mixture of
inclusive and exclusive prescriptions. The result, if cumbersome, is
reasonably precise. The first point to note is that a consumer sale
includes transactions in services as well as in goods. The
amendments to the Consumer Protection Act consequently have a
significantly wider application than the well known implied terms of
the Sale of Goods Act. 8 The inclusion of service contracts will
extend the Act not only to purchases exclusively of services, such as
the professional work of lawyers, but also to mixed agreements for
materials and labour, such as repair contracts. None of these
arrangements were or are subject to the Sale of Goods Act and are
questionably protected at common law by the judicial implication of
analogous standards. Doubt about the extent of the seller's
responsibilities is dispelled now that all these kinds of transactions
will be regulated by the Consumer Protection Act when the
purchaser is a consumer.
In principle, the Act distinguishes a consumer sale by the way the
goods are employed by the purchaser. If they are for his personal
use and consumption and not for resale or business purposes, then
the transaction will be governed by the Consumer Protection Act.
The distinction effectively protects all individual consumers, but is
breached by the explicit exclusion of associations of individuals. 9
To the extent that the intention of the legislation is to exclude
unincorporated business associations, along with such expressly
mentioned groups as partnerships and corporations, the clause is
consistent but unnecessary. All varieties of purchases for business
purposes are already excluded. 10 Unfortunately, the phrase may
envelope private individuals who are joint purchasers of a valuable
item, and also groups of individuals organized for community or
consumer purposes. The exclusion of such groups of individuals
from the protections of the Act when engaged directly in consumer
activities would seem regretable and unnecessary.
8. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 274, ss. 14-17.

9. CPA, s. 20C (1) (c).
10. CPA. s. 20C (1) (b).
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The obligations of the seller under the amendments to the
Consumer Protection Act are more extensive than his obligations
under the Sale of Goods Act. That is to say, the seller is obliged to
fulfil the condition that he has a right to sell the goods, the warranty
that the purchaser shall have quiet enjoyment and unencumbered
freedom of use of the goods, the conditions that the goods supplied
match their contract description, are suitable for the particular
purpose of the buyer if made known to the seller, and, in all cases,
are at least of merchantable quality, and finally, the condition that
the goods shall match both description and sample when sold by
sample. In addition to these customary obligations imposed in all
sales transactions, the amendments have also provided for several
new duties upon the seller.
The first obligation is a second attempt at imposing a standard of
merchantability. Such duplication is unfortunate since it may lead to
uncertainty. The new obligation of merchantability is much more
simply expressed than that contained in the Sale of Goods Act: "a
condition that the goods are of merchantable quality, except for
such defects as are described."" This implied condition is
unencumbered with provisos for its operation, as is the first and
original merchantability clause taken from the Sale of Goods Act. In
particular, it is no longer necessary for the buyer to show that the
goods "are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description". Presumably a consumer purchaser may sue
upon either or both of these implied conditions, and may recover
under the new standard of merchantability notwithstanding his
seller's technical defence to the traditional standard. To that extent,
the easing of limitations upon the seller's obligation of merchantability from the consumer's point of view is to be approved.
Nevertheless, there is a danger that the courts may interpret the
words "merchantable quality" in accordance with the old cases
over that phrase as contained in the original version of the
obligation. By this means there is a risk that the new clause will in
fact be no freer of restrictions and produce no greater advantages to
the purchasing consumer than the old one. For fear of this danger, it
might have been better to have used an entirely new phrase, or, at
least, to have omitted the original version taken from the Sale of
Goods Act. Possibly it would have been best to have redefined
merchantability so as to reflect clearly its intended social purposes
11. CPA, s. 20C (3) (h).
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today, as, for instance, has been done in the recent amendment to
the United Kingdom Sale of Goods Act. 12
At least a partial effort has been made to expand the scope of the
phrase "merchantable quality" by the addition of two further
implied conditions. The seller is now clearly responsible for the
quality of the goods he delivers as if they are new and unused,
unless he has otherwise described them to the purchaser at the time
of negotiation. 1 3 However, this new clause does not say that the
standard of merchantable quality is applicable to the sale of used
goods. Nor, incidently, does it say that it is not. Hence, to the extent
that the cases have questioned the responsibility of the seller under
the Sale of Goods Act, and therefore potentially under the
Consumer Protection Act, for the quality of used goods, the matter
is regretably still at issue. 14
The amendments have closed another ground of contention of
injured consumers by additionally making sellers responsible for the
durability of their goods. Previously, the notion of merchantability
had involved a standard of quality of goods at the time of their sale,
but not thereafter. The only subsequent responsibility of a seller was
for breach of his contract by the discovery of a latent defect in the
goods that could be proved to have been present at the time of the
sale. Only in these circumstances could the seller be held
responsible for the durable quality of the goods he sold. If they wore
out in an unreasonably short period of time then the buyer had no
recourse. Caveat emptor. This restriction was entirely unreasonable
in view of the fact that most expensive goods today involve
complicated, often electrical, machinery in which no average buyer,
even no technically qualified purchaser, can tell in advance through
ordinary observational tests whether the goods are likely or not to
wear out in a short time. Whereas the seller or his manufacturers
must be capable of knowing through their production process what
the average expected useful life of any of their goods may be and
may control that time period by improving the quality of the goods
or their component parts, or alternatively by inbuilding their
obsolescence.
12. 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, s. 62 (1A) as amended by Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms)Act 1973, 1973,c.13,s.7.
13. CPA, s. 20C (3) (i).
14. See CPA, s. 20C (3) (h), (i) & (4). A close reading of paragraph (i) in the
context of paragraph (h) as interpreted by subsection(4) many even compound the

issue.
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Now the seller in a consumer sale must ensure that the goods are
durable. There is implied into his contract a condition "that the
goods shall be durable for a reasonable period of time having regard
to the use to which they would normally be put and to all the
surrounding circumstances of the sale". 15 This clause is the first
anywhere in Canada to impose responsibility for the durability of all
consumer goods upon sellers. It goes some way to protecting
consumer purchasers where their goods break down or wear out in
too short a space of time. However, the test of durability is not
particularly precise; in fact the clause invites litigation. Perhaps that
is inevitable until the courts establish reasonable expectations for
the durability of different classes of goods. Nevertheless, the
control of "surrounding circumstances" are almost entirely in the
hands of sellers and manufacturers. Doubtless the practices of an
industry and the opinion of its experts will be called upon to
establish in court what is reasonable in a particular set of
surrounding circumstances. The problem of design control without
inhibiting industrial creativity or consumer choice is very difficult.
The instant standard will do no more than compare like goods from
the same industry. Even with this limited function, it would be
valuable if the durability clause made clear that it applies not only to
products as a whole but also to component parts of each item where
appropriate. Moreover the amendments do not tackle the even larger
problems of after-sales services, namely the maintenance of stocks
of parts and the provision of repairs, whether goods break down
through fair wear and tear or in breach of the seller's responsibility
for durability.
The last addition of the amendments to the Consumer Protection
Act is an obligation on the part of the seller with respect to the
standard of services he provides. Henceforth there is an implied
condition in a sale of services, with or without goods, that they
"shall be performed in a skillfull and workmanlike manner". 16 The
addition of this clause, or some similarly phrased standard of
performance, was necessary as a corollary to the inclusion of
service agreements within the definition of a consumer sale. Where
properly trained service personnel are involved the new condition is
unlikely to vary present standards of contractual work. It is,
however, a most valuable addition for the protection of consumer
15. CPA, s. 20C (3) (j).
16. CPA, s. 20C(5).
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purchasers where incompetent work is performed. Now there is a
ground for an action in contract besides the traditional suit in tort.
Consequently an injured purchaser will have a greater choice of
remedies from which to select. When his contract is for goods and
services, he will no longer be limited to suing for damages in tort
but may follow the contractual remedy of rejecting the goods and
recovering any money he has paid.
There is nothing to suggest that the new standard for contractual
services will not be strictly applied against sellers along with the
other implied obligations in the Consumer Protection Act, just as
the comparable obligations under the Sale of Goods Act have been
exercised. As a result, professional persons are likely to be
concerned that they will become strictly liable for the provision of
services, and will no longer be measured by the standard of fault
applicable in the law of negligence. However, the change in legal
responsibility will be most unlikely to affect their ultimate
culpability. The standard that is to be strictly enforced has its own
inbuild reasonableness. Even the law of contract respects that the
question "what is a skillfull and workmanlike provision of
services" involves an objective standard of normal practices of the
average competent professional person in the particular circumstances.
All the implied obligations of the seller are now supported by a
provision that any attempts to disclaim such responsibility are void.
Unlike the Sale of Goods Act, which gives pre-eminence to the
principle of contract law that the intention of the parties shall be
respected and thus permits the exclusion of provisions of that Act,
the implied conditions under the Consumer Protection Act are
mandatory. 17 Quite apart from the familiar social arguments
respecting the consumer's lack of freedom to contract that are
usually rehearsed in support of the prohibition of disclaimer clauses,
the statutory terms are themselves only minimum standards of
quality and for that reason alone their mandatory imposition in
consumer transactions is eminently reasonable. Henceforward,
consumer purchasers will not have to worry about the difficulties of
recovery when they are victims of the supply of shoddy goods under
written terms. On the other hand, retailers will have to sell second
quality goods as seconds at reduced prices, as all responsible dealers
have customarily done, and may no longer pass them off as top
17. CPA,s. 20E.
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quality goods with an elaborate "warranty" that is, in fact, an
obscure disclaimer of responsibility.
Yet the scope of the provision avoiding disclaimers of statutory
liability seems to be severely limited. It appears to cure only written
exemption clauses. The opening words, "any written term or
acknowledgement", arguably exclude oral statements by the seller
or his salesclerk in the negotiating stage of a transaction. Written
disclaimers of liability are surely the most common form at present.
However, it would not be difficult for retailers to change their
practices to suit their ends. It would be a pity if the Act merely led
sellers to train their salesclerks to give effective oral disclaimers.
Surely exemption from statutory responsibility for quality is
objectionable in principle, regardless of form.
Upon the occasions of its operation, the disclaimer provision is,
happily, enlarged to prevent its own evasion. It additionally avoids
any abrogations of responsibility to pay compensation for breach of
a statutory obligation. The full extent of the consumer purchaser's
remedies in contract for breach is thereby protected. Regretably,
while a cure for disclaimer clauses has been provided, prevention
has not. It remains permissible to insert exemption clauses in a
consumer sale. While their continued inclusion is ineffective at law,
their use may remain highly persuasive to a consumer who happens
to read his contract and is not precisely knowledgeable of his rights
under the Consumer Protection Act. There is no social justification
for such application of disclaimer clauses in terrorem. Prevention of
void disclaimer clauses might easily have been achieved by the
addition of a simple penal prohibition.
Outlawry of disclaimer clauses would also have another
incidental advantage to consumer purchasers. The amendments to
the Consumer Protection Act were not intended to prevent express
warranties or guarantees by retailers or manufacturers. The
provision is only intended to abolish disclaimers of the minimum
implied liability at law. If prohibition of such disclaimers had been
effected, then henceforth guarantee and warranty cards would only
be allowed to include additional liability, expressly assumed by the
seller or manufacturer, beyond the statutory minimum standards. To
that extent, warranty and guarantee cards would then become more
nearly what they imply and what the consuming public assumes
them to be, rather than the present traps for the unwary.
By the addition of section 20D, the Consumer Protection Act will
now also partially regulate referral sales. These transactions involve
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a technique of selling whereby the vendor gives a gift or other
benefit to the prospective purchaser, generally by way of
inducement to him to buy, upon receipt of a list of names and
addresses of friends and neighbours to whom he is referred to
continue his selling efforts. Receipt of the gift or benefit is usually,
but not necessarily, contingent upon a successful sale to one of the
referred parties. This selling technique is, arguably, socially
objectionable because it preys upon the gullibility of individuals,
who expect to receive something for nothing. In fact, the seller
cannot afford to give a supposed gift for nothing, but must by some
means increase his price in such a way as to cover the costs of any
benefit he may eventually pass on. Some commentators suspect that
the extent of price inflation more than adequately covers the costs of
the gifts and benefits that the seller actually grants, especially where
they are only available upon the contingency that subsequent sales
are actually made to the referred parties. Generally the first buyer
has no way of knowing whether or not any referrals are in fact
successful, and therefore cannot claim his contingent gift or benefit.
Prevention of some such social evil must, presumably, be behind
the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act since it now
proclaims that a consumer sale with a contingent gift or benefit is
"not binding on the purchaser". This result, however, appears to be
only a partial solution to the problem. Since a referral sale is no
longer to be binding upon a consumer purchaser, the seller will not
be able to sue him for any unpaid price. To this extent, the gullible
consumer may in fact be relieved of his obligations. Yet he cannot
get out of the contract entirely and recover any money that he has
already paid. There is no statutory provision that the contract is void
or that he may avoid it. It is probably also unfair to the seller to let
the consumer keep the goods without any payment for them. The
whole provision seems too capricious a solution to the problem of
referral sales. It permits the losses on the agreement to lie where
they happen to fall, depending upon the extent of performance of
the sale before the consumer wakes up to the bad bargain he has
struck and cares to stop it.
The regulation of referral sales is further compounded by another
section in the new Direct Sellers' Licensing and Regulation Act.18
Since most referral sales are made on the doorstep they will be
caught by this Act as well as the Consumer Protection Act. The
18. DSLRA, s. 24(2).
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results may be very confusing. The Direct Sellers' Licensing and
Regulation Act prohibits altogether the offer of a contingent gift in
the negotiation of a direct sale, but it does not otherwise allow the
consumer to avoid his responsibilities under the contract of purchase
he may subsequently make. In other words, the Direct Sellers'
Licensing and Regulation Act prevents incentives without affecting
the accompanying contract of sale, whereas the Consumer
Protection Act permits the offer of incentives but grants to the
consumer the protection that the sale itself is not binding upon him.
If a particular consuming purchaser is in the happy position by
which both Acts apply to his transaction, he may in fact be
satisfactorily protected, - always provided he has not already paid
the purchase price for the goods. But surely this confusion of
controls in two separate enactments is not an adequate state for the
law and does not reflect a carefully thought out social policy
towards referral sales. In light of the proposed amendments to the
federal Combines Investigation Act,' 9 which will totally prohibit
referral selling, reconsideration of consumer protection for the
victims of this trading technique will be imperative.
Since the new Direct Sellers' Licensing and Regulation Act has
already been raised in regard to referral sales it is appropriate to
discuss its main implications next. It replaces the old Direct Sellers
Act. 20 Its chief function is to update and develop the Act it repeals.
The purpose of the old Direct Sellers Act appears to have been
continued in the new Direct Sellers' Licensing and Regulation Act,
although in some respects the expansion has been so great as to
leave the legislative intention unclear. The main functions of these
Acts are to regulate the business of direct sellers and to provide
exceptional remedies for consumer purchasers under direct sales
contracts. The new Act elaborates all of these purposes. It is upon
its developments that this note will comment.
The Act is only applicable to direct sales. The limited definition
of direct selling in the old Act was a major obstacle to its intended
consumer protection. It was aimed at the majority of direct sales
transactions, namely those made on the doorstep from house to
house, but included no others. Subsequently, difficulties have
occurred with enticements to purchase conducted in hotels or motels
upon invitation there, by written solicitation and by telephone
19. Bill C-2, 1st Session, 30th Parliament, 23 Elizabeth II, 1974 (first reading,
October 2, 1974) s.36.4.
20. S.N.S. 1969, c.5 as amended.
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orders. The intention of the phrase "direct selling" seems to
include all transactions negotiated in circumstances that encourage
or permit pressurized salesmanship. They may occur when the
buyer does not have alternative goods to choose or to compare, or
when his opportunity to shop around for alternative prices is absent,
or simply when he is unable to avoid the blandishments of the seller
because they are closeted in a private place. In an effort to cover all
such situations, the definition of direct selling in the new Act
specifically refers to the kinds of difficulties already mentioned and
extends generally to "selling or offering for sale or soliciting orders
for the future delivery of goods or services

. . .

by any means other

than by a merchant from a recognized retail store . . .,,.21 It also
explicitly includes any sale or offering for sale of a hearing aid,
regardless of the circumstances.
The definition is enormously broad. It refers the reader to two
other definitions to assist understanding. First, the Act defines a
recognized retail store negatively by excluding a host of premises
where business is regularly conducted. Examples include display
rooms, offices, repair shops, warehouses, studios, as well as hotels
and motels. 22 Thus it is apparent that a garage man in repairing a car
is conducting a direct sale within the Act because he deals from
premises that are not a recognized retail store. Likewise, it would
seem that any transaction with an agent of a distributor or chain
retailer who merely has a local display room or office is also a direct
sale because the outlet is not regarded as a recognised retail store. In
fact, all businesses that regularly provide services, whether with or
without goods, are likely to be classed as direct sellers either
because their work is done in situ or because it is completed in a
repair shop or office. Even sales of goods from a regular store may
be treated as direct sales, because the scope of the Act is further
broadened by its definition of a merchant. The term does not include
a person who operates a recognised retail store if more than 50% of
his goods or services are transacted outside of that store by means of
direct selling2 3 . The effect is to extend the Act to every transaction of
storekeepers who conduct the major part of their business off their
premises.
Little imagination is necessary to dream up a multitude of
circumstances in which business is regularly conducted and which
21. DSLRA, s.2(d) (see note 7).
22. DSLRA, s. 2(j).
23. DSLRA, s. 2(g). See also s. 6(h).
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now will be caught within the Direct Sellers' Licensing and
Regulation Act. Of consumer transactions, the only statutory
exclusions are a small number of reasonably petty considerations, or
jurisdictional necessities.24 They involve such items as the sale of
newspapers, campaigns for charitable organizations, sales by
Crown corporations and any transactions regulated by federal or
other provincial statutes. The regulations exclude transactions under
$25, save for magazines, photographs, records, kitchen utensils
and, of course, hearing aids. The Act is clearly intended as
protection for consumers and to regulate only commercial traders. A
number of subsections prevent its operation higher up the chain of
production between manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers and
retailers themselves. 2 5 An individual seller who places a classified
advertisement is not affected by the legislation since it is directed to
26
sales "in the course of business" as a direct seller.
The breadth of scope of the Act is probably far greater than is
necessary to control the kind of pressurized sales techniques at the
core of the notion of direct selling. In an effort to catch in its ambit
all examples of unacceptable direct sales methods, the Act appears
to have enveloped far too many acceptable and customary sales
practices and salesmen. The net is so widely cast as to shed doubt on
the intention of the Act as a whole. It is possible to argue that the
legislation is no longer aimed at the traditionally conceived direct
seller, but is intended to permit the regulation of virtually all sales
and selling practices other than in regular stores and shops.
Certainly the minister responsible has plenty of power to make
regulations under the Act to control a broad range of commercial
activity. 27
Whether such wide sweeping control is socially necessary may be
doubtful. While the minister also has ample power to exempt
specific classes of persons, 28 it is against the principle of our law to
exclude commercial freedoms unnecessarily or to place an
excessive range of personal action under bureaucratic discretion.
Probably the scope of the new Direct Sellers' Licensing and
Regulation Act, in its efforts to overcome the recognised social
limitations of the old Direct Sellers Act, has exceeded reasonable
24. See DSLRA, ss. 6(a)-(d), (i), 7 and its Regulations, s.21.
25. DSLRA, s. 6(e)-(g).
26. DSLRA, s. 2(a).
27. See DSLRA, s. 35, especially para (i).

28. DSLRA, s. 35 (g), (h). And see the Regulations, s.20.
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bounds. Ultimately it is the operation of the Act that matters. Its
effectiveness will depend upon the ability of the government to
enforce its regulatory requirements. Its actual capacity to control its
intended variety of hot footed salesmen travelling the province,
without restriction on other tradesmen, has yet to be tested.
To the extent that the new Act provides for the licensing and
bonding of all varieties of direct sellers, 29 its broad scope is
potentially most protective of consumers. Since the old statute
fatally lacked any registration system the means of administratively
regulating direct sellers was absent. For this objective, the new Act
grants suitable powers to those in control but does not provide any
guidance as to suitable standards of conduct.
The powers of control are mainly by the discretionary issue,
suspension and cancellation of licences and the requirement of
bonding. 30 The direct seller himself is fully protected to the extent
31
that he has a right of appeal against an unsatisfactory decision.
However, the registrar responsible for the administration of the
licensing system arguably receives insufficient direction from the
Act in the exercise of his discretion. He must issue a licence if the
applicant meets all the fees, bonds and conditions set by the Act,
and its regulations. 32 However he may suspend or cancel a licence
for violation of the Act, the regulations, or any restrictions imposed
thereunder, or for misrepresentation, fraud or dishonesty, or for
what he considers incompetency or untrustworthiness in the conduct
33
of the direct seller's business.

Objection may chiefly be directed against the last ground of
decision. While it is commendable that there should be some means
of expeditiously removing unreliable and unscrupulous direct
sellers, there needs to be clear legislative or regulatory guidance
about competency in the host of trades controlled by the Act. The
liberality of the statutory phrases do not assist the registrar himself
in establishing acceptable standards of conduct amongst direct
sellers. Neither does such phraseology show the direct sellers
themselves what standards they are expected to maintain or against
29. DSLRA, ss. 5, 10 and its Regulations, ss. 8-10. The Act requires a licence be
held by every firm of direct sellers and all their salesmen.
30. See DSLRA, ss. 8(1), 9(1), 18, 26, 28.
31. DSLRA, s. 39.
32. The Regulations do grant discretion to the registrar in applying the conditions,
such as the size of a bond to be posted or the need for an audited financial

statement, for the issuance of a licence to each applicant individually.
33. DSLRA, s. 18(2).
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which they may appeal unfavourable decisions. 3 4 Nor does such
openness of legislative language give any indication to consumer
purchasers as to what standard of sales and service assistance they
may reasonably expect and to what conduct they may reasonably
object.
So far as consumers' personal remedies are concerned, the broad
scope of the Act has a distinct advantage. It affords the
extraordinary protections established by the Act to a very wide
range of consumers. Any purchaser under a direct sales agreement
has additional contractual rights and remedies against his seller
beyond the protections provided by the Sale of Goods Act and the
Consumer Protection Act. The Direct Sellers' Licensing and
Regulation Act requires contracts to be in writing and to contain
certain specified information. 3 5 Necessary details about the direct
seller and his place of business must be included together with a
statement of the warranties or guarantees he is providing or "where
there is no warranty or guarantee a statement to that effect." 3 6 This
phrasing is unfortunate and may be confusing. To the extent that it
is intended to refer to the seller's express warranties, if any, it is
accurate but misleading. A consumer, not knowing the difference
between express and implied warranties might reasonably assume
that a statement of no warranty has precisely that effect. Whereas,
the recent amendments to the Consumer Protection Act, already
discussed in this note, actually impose minimum warranties in a
direct sale as in any other consumer transaction. It is unfortunate
that a document, commendably required in order to inform the
consumer of his rights, can be permitted to contain such a
misleading half truth.
The Act also provides, as did the old Direct Sellers Act, an
additional contractual right to the consumer to cancel the direct sales
agreement. The time period for cancellation under the new
legislation is now extended from five to ten days. The written
contract must also contain a notice of the right to cancel in words
prescribed by the Act and required to be at the top of the first page:
34. Indeed he may never learn why his licence was suspended or cancelled since
the registrar appears under no duty to provide written reasons for his action.
35. DSLRA, s. 20. The Regulations, s. 15, now prescribe that the sections of the

Act themselves (ss. 20-23) that specify the required information and establish the
consequent rights of consumers shall also be reproduced verbatim in the written

contract.
36. DSLRA, s. 20(e).
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You can cancel this agreement by notice in writing within ten
days after you have signed it. If you do not cancel this agreement
within the ten days, you may not be able to cancel it afterwards.
You can send your notice by registered mail to (name and address
of direct seller shall be inserted here) or you may deliver it there
yourself. You must mail it or deliver it before the end of the ten
days. If you cancel it, any money
you paid and any goods you
37
traded in will be returned to you.
These words are also implied as a term of the agreement and cannot
be disclaimed. 3 8 A copy of the written contract containing all
required information must be delivered to the consumer immediately upon its execution. 3 9 For failure to do so, the direct seller
pays a civil penalty as well as facing summary prosecution. 40 Lack
of the prescribed notice about cancellation gives the purchaser the
right to cancel his contract up to thirty days after first receipt of the
goods or services. 4 ' The direct seller may recover from his omission
by personal delivery of a separate written notice of the right to
cancel. Then the ten day period only is available to the buyer, but
42
counted from the date of receipt of that notice.
These legislative changes to the right of cancellation reflect the
realization that the old five day rule was ineffective protection for
consumers both because it was too short a period in which to act and
because its existence was generally unknown. However, the not too
scrupulous direct seller may still evade the full force of the
consumer's right to cancel his contract merely by the expediency of
delaying the delivery of the goods. The purchaser may subsequently
regret the contract that he has just made and may even learn of his
cancellation right by reading his written agreement, yet he still may
be lulled into thinking that it is of no effect if he does not hear again
from the direct seller. Then what may have seemed only a bad
dream will turn into cold reality when the goods are delivered after
the ten day period has run out. Were the Act to make the
cancellation period run, not from the date of the agreement, but
from the date of delivery of the goods or services under the contract,
this loophole for the unscrupulous direct seller would be defeated.
37. DSLRA, s. 20(g).
38. DSLRA,s. 21(1). And see s. 34 which avoids all attempts to disclaim any

provision of the Act.
39. DSLRA, s. 24(1).

40. A direct seller is liable to summary conviction for failing to comply with any
provision of the Act. See DSLRA s. 36.
41. DSLRA, s. 21(2).
42. DSLRA, s. 21(3), (4).
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In addition to an automatic cancellation right within ten days, the
buyer may also cancel the contract any time up to six months after
signature even, it seems, if the goods or services meet the contract.
The extra right to cancel is granted by the Act where the direct seller
is not licensed, or is in breach of his licence, or where the goods are
not delivered for 90 days. 43 This indeed is a stringent remedy for
consumers, especially if exercised collectively. The prospect of up
to six months business falling in must be a powerful stimulant to a
direct seller to ensure he is properly licensed.
Upon cancellation, the buyer may expect the return of his
purchase monies, if paid, and any trade in, or its value, and may
retain possession of the goods until such repayment. 4" Such
restitution after cancellation is sensible enough, but the actual
method of accounting may be unfair. While the consumer recovers
everything he has paid, he is not required to credit the direct seller
for the use he may have made of the goods in the meantime. The
purchaser is especially likely to gain a considerable and unfair
advantage where his cancellation is not made for the better part of
six months. Loss of the sale, without loading him with loss through
depreciation of his property, is probably quite serious enough a civil
penality for a direct seller to have to pay.
In a laudable effort to stamp out genuinely abusive practices
associated with direct selling, provision of the prescribed
information and exercise of the right of cancellation is imposed on
any merchant who tries to sell anything through public fairs and
accommodations. The prescription will incidently affect regular
shopkeepers, who are not otherwise required to be registered under
the Act, when they engage in some direct selling on the side. The
contractual requirements of the Act are made to apply "to all sales
that are solicited, negotiated or entered into in any dwelling, motel
or hotel or at any exhibition, trade or fair . . . .45 The wording of
the Act does not limit the transactions to consumer purchases or
even direct sales, but expressly covers all sales. This language
presumably will include trade sales between different elements in
the commercial hierarchy of production even though such
businesses are not regarded by the Act as registerable as direct
43. DSLRA, s. 22.

44. DSLRA, s. 23. Presumably in order to facilitate repayment, the Regulations,
s. 16, require a direct seller to retain all purchase monies in trust until cancellation
or until the cancellation period has expired.

45. DSLRA, s. 25.

698 The Dalhousie Law Journal

sellers. 46 The reason for such interstitial inclusion of commercial
transactions is uncertain. The provision appears illogical. Its effect
on businessmen will probably be more tiresome than tyrannous. As
a result, a regular merchant, whether he normally retails to the
public or distributes to the industry, when he sets up a trade stall at a
local exhibition or convention, must comply with all the contractual
requirements of the Act in dealing with all his customers, consumer
and commercial alike.
The consuming buyer's rights in a direct sale under the new
Direct Sellers' Licensing and Regulation Act are thereby conspicuously developed. He has lost but one that was available under the
old Direct Sellers Act. The purchaser may no longer prevent a direct
seller upon secured credit from repossessing the goods after his
breach in payments, regardless of however many instalments he has
made. Under the old Act, when the consumer had paid two thirds or
more of the purchase price, the direct seller was prevented from
enforcing his real remedies against the goods themselves. 4 7 This
right of the buyer was a real benefit to him even though it was
inappropriately provided in the Direct Sellers Act. It was a rule of
potentially general application to instalment payment contracts and
should be reconsidered for re-enactment in the credit legislation of
the Consumer Protection Act.
Otherwise, the consumer has gained much power over his
contractual relations through his personal remedies of cancellation.
Mostly, they are socially appropriate to cope with the genuine
abuses of direct selling. Yet, just as the broad umbrella of the new
Direct Sellers' Licensing and Regulation Act forces the licensing of
many tradesmen unnecessarily so it will grant protections to many
consumers undeservingly. To that extent, reputable classes of
sellers 48 will now bear extra burdens both of maintaining a licence
and of contracting always in the prescribed written form, the costs
of which will no doubt be reflected in higher prices to consumers.
They, on the other hand, may be encouraged to engage in
unwarranted and abusive cancellations, also at a cost transferable in
higher prices to other consumers.
The other face of price is debt. When a consumer fails to make
payments as they fall due and goes into default, he faces the
46. See the text to note 25, supra.

47. S.N.S. 1969, c. 5, s. 7. Except with leave of the court.
48. Subject to exemption. See DSLRA, s. 35(g) & (h) and the Regulations, ss. 20,
21.
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harrowing experience of collection. Like the direct sellers'
legislation, the new Collection Agencies Act is intended as an
updated and socially reformed replacement for the old Collecting
Agencies Act. 4 9 It continues the functions of regulating professional
debt collectors by a scheme of licensing and bonding. Much of the
Act is concerned with a more elaborate system of registration, and
greater protection of the interests of collectors and collection
agencies by way of hearings and appeals upon licensing decisions.
50
The Act continues to excuse lawyers from its controls.
An important omission from the governance of the Act is the
class of professional debt collectors on their own behalf. The
business of purchasing or taking assignments of debts due to
creditors in order to recover them personally at a profit is a regular,
if speculative, practice. The old Act recognized that such business
needs controlling just as much as the collecting activity of an agency
on behalf of a principal. Consequently, the trade was statutorily
deemed analogous to debt collecting and thus included within the
reach of the regulatory system. 5 1 The new Collection Agencies Act
merely defines a collection agency as: "a person other than a
collector who deals with a debtor for the purpose of obtaining or
arrangingfor money owing to anotherperson, or who holds out to

the public that he provides such a service or any person who sells or
offers to sell forms or letters represented to be a collection system or
scheme." 5 2(emphasis added) This phraseology clearly refers only
to collection agencies as agents, and not as principals in their own
interests. The omission is unfortunate and may be serious. Most of
the trade in bad debts is taken by collection agencies, who will need
to be registered for their agency business in any event. But nothing
in the Act requires them to abide by its controls, especially its
standards of professional conduct, in prosecution of their business
as assignees and principals. Worse, there is every encouragement to
the unscruplous amongst them hereafter to take all their business by
sale or assignment so as to avoid the requirements of the Act
altogether.
The major innovation of the Act is the inclusion of a form of code
of professional conduct for debt collectors. It is advanced chiefly by
a designated list of abusive practices. In part, the acceptability of
49. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 38.
50. CAA, s. 4 (see note 4).
51. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 38, s. 1(5).
52. CAA, s. 2(a).
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some practices depends upon the particular procedures of an
individual collection agency. For instance, no form or form letter
may be used to collect a debt unless it has previously been filed with
the registrar, 53 responsible for the administration of the licensing
system. In originally applying for a licence, a collection agency is
required, as under the old Act, to provide copies of its intended
agreements with principals and all its forms to be used in
collecting. 54 Regretably, the Act does not mention what the registar
shall do with these documents. It is to be hoped he will scrutinize
them for reasonableness and fairness. Even so, the Act does not say
that he may prohibit their use, although he does have a discretion
not to issue a licence. 5 5 How much better it would be if objective
standards for scrutiny had been publicly proclaimed by statute.
The procedures of an individual collection agency's accounting
are also subject to scrutiny. The Act requires the agency in the
conduct of its business to keep satisfactory records and ledgers and
to maintain a trust account for the receipt of clients' monies. 56 In
part to support this control, the Act gives the registrar wide powers
57
of entry and inspection.
Most importantly, the code of conduct in the Act further specifies
actions that collection agencies or their collectors may not take in
their efforts to recover debts. 5 8 For instance, they may not place a
telephone call collect to a debtor and may not communicate with
him at all once he has referred them in writing to his lawyer. They
may not harass a debtor by frequent contacts and shall make none at
all after nine o'clock at night or on Sunday. Collectors are forbidden
to harry a debtor through his friends, relations, neighbours, or
employer either by spreading false information about him or by
inquiring about his livelihood or way of life, except to obtain his
address. They may not charge the debtor with the costs of their
53. CAA, s. 19 (g).
54. CAA, s. 6(3).
55. See CAA, s. 13(1)(a). The apparent discretion of the registrar to withhold the
grant of a licence on any grounds, as well as the supply of unsatisfactory collection

forms, opens the CAA to the kind of criticism leveled at the registrar's powers
under the DSLRA to suspend or cancel licences. See the text to notes 30-34, supra.

The CAA sets a good example for the DSLRA on suspension and cancellation, as
opposed to issuance powers, in that the statutory code of conduct provides the

registrar with just the kind of objective criteria needed to guide his decisions.
56. CAA, s. 19(a) &(b).
57. CAA, s. 21.
58. CAA, s. 20.
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collection efforts on behalf of their principals. All of these
proscriptions, and more listed in the Act, are reinforced by a general
prohibition against collectors threatening, abusing or intimidating a
debtor.
This kind of professional code of practice in the Act is to be
applauded. No doubt the administrators of the licensing system
under the old Act operated on some such very similar scheme.
However, it applied by way of administrative policy; that is to say,
informally and not openly. Now it is plain to collection agencies and
their collectors what the bounds are beyond which they may not step
in their business activities. 59 Likewise, it is clear to consumers, who
find themselves as debtors the subject of collection, what kind of
treatment they may expect from collectors and what practices they
may reasonably object to.
Unfortunately for the debtor, he has no personal remedy for a
breach by the collector of the statutory code of behaviour.6 0
Possibly he has suffered nervous shock from harassment or lost his
employment through misleading insinuations. The Act only
envisions a response to such breaches by the Crown. Thus the
debtor may complain about the miscreant to the registrar, who may
take preventive action against future abuse by suspension or
cancellation of the collector's licence. 6 1 Alternatively the collector
may be summarily prosecuted. 6 2 But neither course of action
compensates the debtor for any harm already done to him.
Nevertheless, the development of a proclaimed code of conduct is
a considerable protection for consumer debtors. More is the pity it
does not apply to all debt collecting, whether by collection agencies
or creditors themselves. The system of licensing professional debt
collectors has proved to be an effective social control by itself. The
code of professional conduct declared in the new Collection
Agencies Act can only add to its success. But what are fair and
reasonable procedures for debt collecting by professionals, ought
surely to be minimum standards of acceptable conduct for anyone
who tries to collect his own debts. The code should apply to all debt
59. And they should be precisely knowledgeable of them since the Regulations, s.
11, call for the successful completion of a written examination on the Act before a
licence may be issued.
60. Unless the courts will in future imply a statutory duty of care.
61. CAA, s. 15(1). But the consumer has no power to compel the registrar to act.

62. CAA, s. 23 makes it an offence to contravene or to omit to fulfil any provision
of the Act or its Regulations.
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collections, whether the collector is required to be registered as a
professional agent or not.
Much more may be written about the three Acts, subject of this
note. In particular, the management of their licensing systems could
usefully be scrutinized. Here, only the statutory reforms and
developments have been picked out for comment. Moreover, the
Acts have been reviewed from the perspective of the public rather
than the bureaucracy, in an effort to expose the new ground rules
operating between the parties to a consumer transaction. These
approaches have been taken in the hope and belief that they will
satisfy the enquiries of practising lawyers, whether as counsel for
corporate or consumer interests.

